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Who taught Adam to speak? 1
Spccch is the best show man puts on. It is 
his own "act" on the stage of evolution, in 
which he comes before the cosmic backdrop 
and really "docs his stuff'. -  B.L. Whorf
Arthur C. Custance 
A bstract
It is taken fo r  granted that the first man, being half-ape, 'spoke ’ by copying 
them. Research shows that such grunts and cries cannot ‘evolve' into cul­
tured speech because the speech organs and brain structure required fo r  
human language are entirety different from  those needed fo r  o f  animal com­
munication.
The difference in animal and human thinking processes is not merely one o f  
degree but rather o f  kind. This difference is seen in the use o f  signs vs. 
symbols, o f  emotional and situational language v.v. conceptual, objective 
language. No animal communication system can account fo r  the human 
one.
Perhaps, then, speech is instinctive? No, fo r  people, however primitive, 
have been found  without a language. Yet unless spoken to, one does not 
learn to speak as demonstrated by fera l (wild) children and deaf-mutes 
(like Helen Keller). So the question is -  who spoke to the firs t human being 
-A d a m  to teach him?
About all that scientific investigation can do is to demonstrate what cannot 
be the origin o f  this extraordinary trait o f  human nature.
The only light we have is from  revelation. The firs t two chapters o f  Genesis 
not only tell us Who spoke firs t but also how the process o f  language was 
acquired. But the implications o f  the necessity o f  this unique faculty in 
terms o f  his humanity and the purpose o f  his very creation are profound.
In 1957, Arthur C Custancc (1910-1985) first published this essay under the current title, 
as Doorway Paper #1, part of his successful Doorway Papers series and revised it in 
1976. Ms Evelyn M White, Manager o f Doorway Publications, has especially edited it 
for Koers. The full text is available from the publisher at 38 Hlora Drive #41, Hamilton 
ON, Canada L9C 7L6
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1. Introduction
Many years ago Humboldt observed that if there was a transition from animal to 
man, that transition took place with the acquisition o f  speech (see Lyell, 1873: 
518). But he added, with rare insight, that in order to speak, man must already 
have been human. The problem of accounting for the origin o f speech appeared 
to him therefore to be insoluble. Apart from revelation, it still is.
Because o f the influence o f Darwin’s theories, it seemed at one time unnecessary 
to question the derivation o f human speech from animal cries. Essentially the two 
were the same; it was merely a question o f the degree o f complexity. Following 
in the steps o f earlier social anthropologists who were arranging the various pri­
mitive cultures in a sequence from the simple to more complex, thereby illustrat­
ing man’s supposed climb to Parnassus, those who philosophized about language 
assumed that the strange grunts, clicks and grimaces o f the lowliest ‘savages’ 
were evidence that speech, like all else, had evolved by barely perceptible steps 
from simple to complex (see Goldenweiser, 1945:508).
2. The evolutionary account
But little by little it appeared that the problem was more difficult. To begin with, 
more careful studies o f the most primitive societies, made by men in the field who 
spent enough time to learn to use the native languages they were studying, began 
to reveal that far from being simple, they were often exceedingly complex (see 
Kroeber, 1948:231). Indeed so rich in terms did they eventually prove to be in 
many cases that such an authority as Levy-Bruhl (1926:105-136) came to doubt 
(perhaps unjustifiably) whether they even thought as we do. The difference could 
no longer be measured in terms o f ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ but as a different way of 
conceiving reality, indeed from one point o f view, a more complex way of 
viewing it. G.G. Simpson (1966:477) rightly remarked:
A t the  p re sen t tim e  no  lan g u ag es  are  p rim itiv e  in th e  se n se  o f  be in g  
sig n if ican tly  c lo se  to  th e  o rig in s o f  language. E ven  th e  p e o p le  w ith  leas t 
co m p lex  cu ltu re  h av e  h ig h ly  so p h is tica ted  lan g u ag es , w ith  c o m p lex  g ra m ­
m ar, and  larg e  v o cab u la rie s  cap ab le  o f  n am in g  and  d isc u ss in g  an y th in g  th a t 
o ccu rs  in the  sp h e re  o ccu p ied  by  th e ir  speakers.
Eric Lenneberg (1967:264) has said that primitive languages actually require 
m ore intelligence to learn than our so-called sophisticated languages do. In fact, 
the simpler the culture, the more complex in this sense was its language likely to 
prove.
Evidently therefore, the whole concept o f arranging these cultures in an evolutio­
nary scale was quite wrong (see Kluckhohn, 1969:148). Abandoning this prin­
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ciple cleared the way for a more careful investigation of the origin of human 
speech, and attention was turned to the problem from several different directions. 
To begin with, an answer was sought to the questions: What is the nature o f hu­
man speech, and do animals ‘speak’ to each other at all? If so, are the two forms 
o f communication related or comparable? If  they are not, we cannot easily derive 
the one from the other. Since, as we shall see, a negative conclusion was reached 
by a number o f investigators, the origin o f human speech remained a profound 
mystery.
Further investigation soon revealed other complications. Speech was always as­
sumed to be instinctive, but the discovery from time to time o f ‘w ild’ or feral 
children without speech, showed clearly that it results only where there has been 
social contact. Moreover, such contact must be with speaking individuals, for it 
was further discovered that someone else has to start the process off for each one 
of us. Company alone does not create communication by speech. Without the 
spark from one party already the possessor o f the faculty, there is no conver­
sation.
Having arrived at this point, it was felt that human beings should be able to en­
courage animals to speak, unless the organs of speech were different in the latter. 
In the course o f time it was concluded from investigation of the anatomy o f the 
higher apes that the organs of certain animals are not basically different, and that 
they therefore ought to be able to speak as we do (see Kroeber, 1948: 231, and 
Fox, 1952:28). Yet apes and monkeys cannot speak. Indeed as J.B. Lancaster 
(1965) rightly observed: "The more that is known about (communication systems 
in monkeys and apes) the less these systems seem to help in the understanding of 
human language." Perhaps language did not evolve at all!
On the other hand, history soon provided instances o f human beings who lacked 
all the normal faculties or speech, i.e., sight, hearing and voice, and yet who 
learned to speak (with their fingers o f course) and to communicate ideas at a very 
high level o f abstraction. This once more seemed to indicate that the real secret 
lay in the structure o f the brain, or in some other quality of human nature, and not 
in the organs o f the voice.
It was therefore concluded that some genetic strain must suddenly have appeared 
to alter the structure o f the human brain in some way at present unknown, thus 
paving the way for the appearance o f  this peculiarly human faculty (see Cassirer, 
1948:31). Yet this does not answer the main problem, even if such a mutation 
could be shown to have occurred. We have on record the case o f two feral child­
ren, brought up entirely in the wilds, without any human companionship except 
that they were themselves companions in isolation, who never between them 
spoke a single word o f any form whatever. Thus we find that even the presence 
o f another human being, possessing a truly human brain (for subsequently they
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were taught to speak, though always with limitations), do not in themselves 
constitute the necessary framework within which speech must inevitably appear.
We are still left therefore, with the problem as to who started the process, for the 
process must be started by someone. While it is true that few authorities believe 
that the human race may be an amalgam o f several distinct and independently 
originated stocks springing from lower forms o f  life, there are many others 
equally committed to an evolutionary origin for man, who hold that he must be 
derived from a single stock. In this single stock we must have a first man and a 
first woman. It matters little what we call them, whether Adam (which simply 
means man) and Eve (which really means ch ild  bearer, i.e. mother), we are still 
dealing with the same two individuals. What is to account for the fact that they 
began to talk to each other, and this has continued wherever their descendants are 
found and without exception, for no people on earth are known without a fully 
developed language. People are known in one part o f the world or another with­
out almost every faculty which we hold to be essentially human, even without 
mother-love, but not one people has ever been found without the faculty of 
speech.
It may be stated simply, then, that scientifically the question is beyond our reach. 
About all that scientific investigations can do is to demonstrate what cannot be 
the origin.
3. The biblical account
In Genesis, however, the story o f the first conversation on earth is revealed. And 
since it is the only story that shows insight into the nature o f m an’s first steps at 
conversation, it is o f peculiar interest -  whether we view it as fantasy or as fact. 
For all about us, eveiy day, there are children learning to speak for the first time 
and showing us consistently a certain pattern o f learning which by its very 
persistence leads us to suppose that it is the only pattern by which man ever 
learned to speak. Not merely the subject o f conversation o f the first pair, but the 
consequences o f it, and the circumstances in which it came to pass, are o f real 
significance for all those who today are concerned with the problem o f human 
nature and conduct. For it is man’s power o f speech which has enabled him to do 
what he has done and to be what he is, whether for good or for ill.
This power o f speech involves the power o f abstraction and o f  self-conscious- 
ness, and o f delayed reaction and decision. It has, in short, made man in part a 
free-willed agent. But it has also enabled him to learn in a unique way and to 
pass on the substance o f his learning so that culture has become cumulative.
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4. Sounds o f speech: signs vs. symbols
But let us revert once more and consider the points raised in the foregoing in 
greater detail. It is strange how frequently what is obviously true turns out to be 
quite false. For centuries it was obvious to everyone that the sun moved around 
the earth: and until acceptance o f this obvious fact was entirely undermined, no 
further progress in astronomy was possible.
That animals talked to one another was equally obvious. In times o f danger a 
shrill warning was uttered, and the answering precautions o f flight were underta­
ken by those who heard the signal, obviously indicating that they clearly under­
stood what was being ‘said.’ Curiously enough some o f the most profound ob­
servations regarding the real nature o f so-called animal speech have finally come 
not from a man who was a naturalist, but from a man who was basically a philo­
sopher interested in the nature o f human nature. George Herbert Mead (1948: 
354-360) showed, in a way which virtually compels assent, that animals are not 
self-conscious and therefore can only utter signals -  which are not expressions of 
thought or o f emotion. Such sounds are uttered involuntarily like the Oh and Ah 
of a man too deeply moved for speech. The excited whining o f a dog in antici­
pation o f food is not the dog’s mind expressing anticipation but a reflex expres­
sing itself. The dog does not express emotion consciously, but the emotion 
expresses itself. Raymond Pearl (1946:115) has pointed out that herd leaders are 
not leaders in the sense that human beings may be, for no thought or reasoning is 
involved. They serve rather as a special sense organ for the whole herd, and their 
position as leader is in a way an accident o f biological processes.
Thus Mead distinguishes between a sound which is a sign, and a sound which is a 
symbol. The first is shared by all creatures able to express emotion, including 
fear and anger, hate and love, and of course in man, laughter. But a sign o f such 
a nature is involuntary as a rule; always involuntary in the case o f animals, but not 
always so in the case o f man who is such a prodigious actor. The Oh o f a man 
suddenly injured is not thought out. It expresses itself. Naturally we understand 
it all; the scream o f fright, the roar o f laughter; both are read, but neither are truly 
language. Mead points out that it is not until a child discovers what the meaning 
o f his own sound to others is, and then deliberately makes the sound with this 
meaning attached to it, that the child speaks. In this sense speech might be held 
to start when a child discovers that it can cry (without compulsion) merely to di­
rect attention to itself. Such an attitude arises out o f self-consciousness and o f the 
consciousness o f others as being similar to oneself.
A child thus discovering the trick o f gaining attention becomes an actor. Darwin 
was interested in the question o f acting  because he felt it threw light on the origin 
o f language. He felt that the actor in pulling a fa c e  to indicate anger was only
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doing what a dog might do when it bared its teeth to frighten its enemy. But this 
assumed that the dog is conscious o f the face he is pulling and realizes that by 
doing it he can frighten his opponent. In actual fact it seems quite certain now 
that for the dog, the fa c e  is pu llin g  itse lf  and no self-consciousness is involved. 
To the other dog it is a sign to which he responds in a characteristic manner. But 
because the originator is moved by emotion and not by abstract or self-conscious 
thought, no speech is involved. It is a sign and not a symbol, for symbols have a 
nature arbitrarily (and therefore consciously) assigned by user and reader alike. 
The actor pulls a face consciously, knowing that it will be interpreted in a given 
way, and his thought thus expressed in a symbolic form and so read and un­
derstood by the audience, is communicated deliberately by what must be termed 
symbolic language. In common speech we may speak o f a sign language, but it 
seems desirable to distinguish between what is in reality a symbol language and 
the unconscious sign o f anger which an animal may express in the presence o f an 
enemy.
5. W ords o f speech: em otional vs. propositional
That animal cries are emotional only, and not conceptual, is now the considered 
opinion o f those who made a study o f the matter. Cassirer (1948:28, 29) pointed 
out:
Here we touch upon the crucial point in our whole problem. The difference 
between propositional language and emotional language is the real landmark 
between the human and the animal world. AH'the theories and observations 
concerning animal language are wide o f the mark if  they fail to recognize 
this fundamental difference. In all the literature o f the subject, there does 
not seem to be a single conclusive proof o f the fact that any animal ever 
made the decisive step from subjective to objective, from affective to pro- 
positional language.
The English neurologist Jackson introduced the term proposition a l language in 
order to account for some very interesting pathological phenomena. He found 
that many patients suffering from aphasia had by no means lost the use o f speech, 
but they could not employ their words in an objective, propositional sense. 
Something had therefore reduced their speech to the level o f animal noise which, 
like the cry o f the parrot, was no longer human language at all.
Meanwhile the clicks and grunts which in popular imagination were taken to be a 
major part o f some primitive languages actually take a very minor place in the 
structure o f such languages. It can be said that the languages o f the most primi­
tive people, as for example the Australian aborigines, are exceedingly full of 
terms that are definitive and specific in the extreme. Indeed, they are so rich in 
terms and names for things that abstract thought becomes well-nigh impossible,
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for there are no such simple things as ‘classes,’ everything is individual and spe­
cific (see Levy-Bruhl,1925:170).
For example, in the Arabic language there are no less than five or six thousand 
terms used in describing the camel -  its shape, size, colour, age and the gait o f the 
animal -  but no one word for the species ‘camel’. Similarly the Aymara Indians 
of Chuciutu in Peru have 209 distinct words for potatoes, and such northern 
people as the Eskimo o f Canada and the Chukchee of Siberia have an almost 
unlimited number of names for snow and ice in every conceivable form, yet not a 
single word for ‘snow.’
The languages o f primitive people all over the world show this same amazing 
wealth. Here objectivity is a characteristic in excess. What is specifically lack­
ing therefore in animal forms of communication is here exemplified to the nth 
degree ... and yet it was formerly thought that such societies would provide us 
with the very link between civilized man and the primates below him.
6. Speech: instinctive or learned
We have pointed out that no people are without a language. From this obser­
vation and because all subjects investigated up till a few years ago had possessed 
the power o f speech no matter how primitive their culture, it was assumed that 
speech was instinctive (see Sapir, 1933). But in time it became apparent that this 
was not so. Although throughout the centuries o f recorded history so-called 
‘w ild’ or feral children have been reported, it was not till comparatively recently 
that such children were found and studied by men whose judgement and 
scholarship were sufficient to guard them against sensational conclusions 
intended to stimulate public imagination. Such children have always been found 
to be without speech.
A very complete treatment o f some 36 cases of feral children was published in 
1966 by J.A.L. Singh and Robert M. Zingg under the title Wolf-Children and  
F eral Man. These children, usually abandoned for various reasons in the first 
years o f life, were brought up by animals which include wolves, bears, pigs, a 
jackal, and even a leopard. Without exception, they did not learn to speak a word 
while in the wild and almost nothing even when later attempts were made to re­
educate them.
Susanne Langer (1952:87) remarked in this connection:
T h e  o n ly  w ell a tte s te d  cases  are  P e te r  the  w ild  bo y , fo u n d  in the  f ie ld s o f  
H an o v er in 1723; V ic to r, k n o w n  as the  ‘S avage o f  A v e y ro n ’ cap tu red  in 
th a t d is tr ic t o f  Southern  F rance  in 1799: and  tw o  little  g irls , A m ala  and
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K am ala  tak en  in  the  v ic in ity  o f  M id n ap u r, India , in  1920. E ven  o f  these, 
o n ly  V ic to r  h as  b een  sc ien tif ica lly  s tu d ied  an d  d escrib ed .
O ne th in g  h o w ev er w e  k n o w  d efin ite ly  ab o u t all o f  them : n o n e  o f  these 
children could speak in any tongue, remembered or invented  (h e r  e m ­
p hasis). A  ch ild  w ith o u t h u m an  co m p an io n s  w o u ld  o f  co u rse  f in d  no  re ­
sp o n se  to  h is  ch a tte rin g ; b u t i f  sp eech  w ere  a  g e n u in e  in s tin c t, th is  sh o u ld  
m ak e  little  d iffe ren ce . C iv ilized  ch ild ren  ta lk  to  th e  ca t w ith o u t k n o w in g  
th a t th ey  are  so lilo q u iz in g , an d  a  d o g  th a t a n sw ers  w ith  a  b a rk  is a  go o d  
aud ien ce : m o reo v e r A m ala  an d  K am ala  h ad  e ach  o ther. Y e t th ey  d id  no t 
talk . W h ere , th en , is th e  lan g u ag e  m ak in g  in stin c t o f  ve ry  y o u n g  ch ild ren ?
It is as though Providence had secured for us by historical ‘accident’ the materials 
we particularly need for testing all such hypotheses. Had we on record merely 
the instances o f lone waifs and strays such as Peter and Victor, we might still 
have argued that they did not speak because they did not have company. Quite 
apart from the observation which Langer makes -  that children talk to animals 
without sensing any incongruity (as adults do too!) -  we have also the record in 
very recent times o f the finding o f two children who shared their strange child­
hood upbringing in the wild and still never spoke one word to each other.
Moreover, every subsequent effort to teach the boy Victor the use of language 
failed conspicuously, and when the question is asked why did he fail when others 
succeeded in part (though very inadequately), the answer seems to be (in 
Langer’s own words), ‘Because he was already about twelve years old’. In other 
words, when Victor was found, he had evidently passed the stage o f development 
where he cou ld  learn a language, whereas the other children in varying degree, 
were still young enough to be taught at least a few words and expressions, though 
none o f them developed into normal human beings.
We may draw a further conclusion from all this, therefore, that the capacity is 
latent in every child for the learning o f a language, even in those who are reared 
in the wild, but this capacity does not guarantee that language will automatically 
arise on its own accord. On the contrary, in each o f these four children no lan­
guage whatsoever did appear o f its own accord. It was only after they had been 
spoken to, that they spoke in turn, and even then only provided that the capacity 
for acquiring the faculty o f thinking in words had not been outgrown (see Tomb, 
1925:553-555).
7. W ords: dependent on vocal chords and brain
Having arrived at this point, the question immediately arose as to whether it might 
be possible to teach animals to speak as men speak, provided instruction was be­
gun early enough. Efforts have been made for years, and continue to be made, to 
open up lines of communication with animals. The prodigious and patient labours
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of the Kelloggs (1933), Hayeses (1951), Gardners (1969:644-672) and Premack 
(1971:808-822) have revealed some surprising facts. It is certain that animals do 
communicate amongst themselves successfully, and that man, by speech, can 
establish contact with them, as indeed he may with his horse or his dog. But 
apparently those animals which seem therefore capable of understanding speech, 
do not themselves have the capacity to speak. Such creatures as Premack’s 
chimpanzees did ‘talk’ by signs, but vocalization has proved quite beyond their 
physiological capacity thus far.
Absence o f speech among animals cannot be attributed to the absence of the 
secondary glossolabial anatomical structures, for they have many phonetic ele­
ments which are also common to human languages. Granted that some of the 
sounds we make might be beyond the capacity of some animals, at least they 
ought to be able to reproduce a kind o f dialect o f their own. But they never do. 
It is felt that this must therefore be due to some lack in the brain. By contrast, 
birds which can vocalize meaningfully to the hearer seem nevertheless without 
the mind necessary to make their own vocalization meaningful to themselves. 
Birds have vocal organs adequate to the task but no mental equipment to make 
the capability useful to them. Other animals may have the mental equipment but 
no vocal organs adequate to communicate their thoughts usefully to men (see 
Custance, 1972:60-73).
Formerly it was customary to assume that the essential difference in animal and 
human thinking processes was one merely o f degree. But when the brain of man 
is compared with that o f the animals, the difference, as Henri Bergson (1944: 
200-201) notes
... a t firs t ap p ea rs  to  be  on ly  a d iffe ren ce  in size  and  co m p lex ity . B u t ju d g ­
ing  b y  fu n c tio n , the re  m u st b e  so m e th in g  e lse  b es id es  ... B e tw een  m an and 
th e  an im a ls  the  d iffe ren ce  is no  longer o n e  o f  deg ree , b u t o f  kind.
The kind of brain that man has results in a mentality that is conceptual in cha­
racter (see Briffault, 1931:762). And it is this conceptual character in man which 
permits speech.
At the present time it does not seem that any animal communication system could 
possibly account for the human one.
8. How sounds become speech
That animals do not speak, nor have they thus far been taught to speak, is not 
because they lack the mechanical means (the muscles in the tongue and throat, 
etc.), but evidently because they do not have the brain structure necessary to 
permit conceptual thought. On the other hand, and this is o f profound impor­
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tance, a human being can be lacking in all the normal requirements for speech and 
yet, because o f the structure o f the brain, the mechanical and secondary handi­
caps can be overcome and conversation be carried on at a very high level o f ab­
straction.
It would almost seem as though Providence were again at work in history, for we 
have two examples o f individuals who were blind, deaf, and dumb, and yet who 
developed a high degree of understanding and education, one becoming an in­
ternationally famous spokesman for her fellow sufferers. Two facts -  (1) that 
such handicapped people could learn to communicate ideas and (2) the circum­
stances surrounding the first steps by which they learned to speak at all -  are o f 
very great significance for our purposes. Moreover, when it is found that both in­
dividuals passed from speechlessness to speech by the very same kind o f process, 
it is a matter o f  considerable interest here.
The names o f these two blind deaf-mutes are Helen Keller and Laura Bridgeman. 
Their story, in so far as it immediately concerns us, is best told in the words of 
their teachers and their own. It is desirable to comment that both individuals had 
learned to tap out with their hands certain signs communicating needs as they 
arose, and that both experienced a day when the real meaning o f these signs was 
discovered by each in turn. Miss Sullivan (1905:315), the teacher o f Helen 
Keller, has recorded the exact date on which the child began to understand the 
meaning o f  human language:
I m u st w rite  y o u  a  line th is  m o rn in g , b e c a u se  so m e th in g  v e ry  im p o rta n t has 
h ap p en ed . H e len  h as tak en  the  se co n d  g re a t step  in  h e r  e d u ca tio n . S h e  has 
lea rn ed  th a t ev e ry th in g  h as a n a m e  an d  th a t th e  m an u a l a lp h a b e t is  th e  k ey  
to  ev e ry th in g  she  w an ts  to  k now . T h is  m o rn in g , w h ile  sh e  w as  w ash in g , 
she  w a n te d  to  k n o w  the  n am e  fo r  ‘w a te r ’. W h en  sh e  w an ts  to  k n o w  the  
n a m e  o f  any th in g , she  p o in ts  to  it, an d  p a ts  m y  han d . I sp e lle d  w -a -t-e - r  an d  
th o u g h t n o  m o re  ab o u t it  un til a f te r  b r e a k f a s t ...
(L a te r  o n ) w e w e n t o u t to  th e  pu m p  h o u se , an d  I m ad e  H e len  h o ld  h e r  m ug 
u n d e r  th e  sp o u t w h ile  I pum ped . A s th e  co ld  w a te r  g u sh e d  fo rth , f i llin g  th e  
m ug , 1 sp e lled  w -a -t-e -r  in H e le n ’s free  han d . T h e  w o rd  c o m in g  so  c lo se  
u p o n  th e  se n sa tio n  o f  co ld  w a te r  ru sh in g  o v e r h e r  h a n d  se em ed  to  sta rtle  
her. S he d ro p p ed  th e  m u g  an d  sto o d  a s  o n e  tran sfix ed . A  n e w  lig h t cam e 
in to  h e r  face . S he sp e lle d  ‘w a te r ’ severa l tim es. T h en  sh e  d ro p p e d  on  the  
g ro u n d  an d  a sk ed  fo r  its  n am e, an d  p o in ted  to  th e  p u m p  an d  tre llis  and  
su d d e n ly  tu rn in g  a ro u n d  she  a sk ed  fo r m y  nam e. I sp e lle d  ‘te a c h e r ’. A ll 
th e  w ay  b ack  to  th e  h o u se  she  w as  h ig h ly  ex c ited  an d  lea rn ed  th e  n a m e  o f  
ev ery  o b je c t she  to u ch ed , so  th a t in a  few  h o u rs  sh e  h a d  ad d e d  th ir ty  n ew  
w o rd s  to  h e r  v o cab u la ry . T h e  n e x t m orn ing  sh e  g o t up  like a  ra d ia n t fa iry .
S he h a s  f litted  fro m  o b je c t to  o b je c t ask in g  th e  n am e  o f  ev e ry th in g  and  
k iss in g  m e fo r  ve ry  g lad n ess. E v e ry th in g  m u st h av e  a  n am e  n o w . W h e r­
ev e r w e go  she  ask s eag e rly  fo r  th e  n am es o f  th in g s  she  h a s  n o t lea rn ed  at
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hom e. S he is an x io u s  fo r h e r  frien d s to  spe ll, an d  eag e r to  teach  the  le tte rs 
to  ev e ry o n e  she  m eets . She d ro p s th e  signs an d  p an to m in e  she  u sed  befo re , 
as soon  as she  h as w o rd s to  su p p ly  th e ir  p lace , an d  th e  acq u irem en t o f  a 
n ew  w o rd  a ffo rd s  h e r  the  liv e liest p leasu re . A n d  w e  n o tice  th a t h e r  face  
g ro w s m o re  ex p ress iv e  each  day.
What a simple account this is, and yet how dramatic. It is almost like being pre­
sent at the birth o f a soul! And how significant do the names o f things become. 
To possess the name is to possess the very object. But we also have Helen’s own 
account o f this experience (Keller, 1905:23-24):
W e w a lk ed  d o w n  the  p a th  to  the  w ell-h o u se , a ttrac ted  b y  a ll th e  frag ran ce  
o f  the  h o n ey su ck le  w ith  w h ich  it w as covered . S om eo n e  w as d raw in g  
w ate r, an d  m y  te a c h e r  p la c e d  m y  h an d  u n d e r the  spou t. A s th e  coo l stream  
g u sh e d  o v e r m y  h an d  she  sp e lled  in to  th e  o th e r  th e  w o rd  ‘w a te r ’, firs t 
s lo w ly , th en  rap id ly . I s to o d  still, m y  w h o le  a tten tio n  fix ed  up o n  th e  m o tio n  
o f  h e r  fingers . S u d d en ly  I fe lt a  m isty  co n sc io u sn ess  as o f  som eth in g  
fo rg o tten , a th rill o f  re tu rn in g  th o u g h t; an d  so m e h o w  th e  m y ste ry  o f  lan ­
g u age w as re v e a le d  to  m e. 1 k n ew  th en  th a t w -a -t-e -r  m ean t th e  w o n d erfu l 
co o l so m e th in g  th a t w as flo w in g  ov er m y  han d . T h a t liv in g  w o rd  aw ak en ed  
m y  sou l, gav e  it ligh t, hop e , jo y , se t it free. T h ere  w ere  b a rrie rs  still, it is 
tru e , b u t b a rrie rs  th a t in tim e  cou ld  be  sw ep t aw ay.
I le ft th e  w e ll-h o u se  eag e r to  learn . E v ery th in g  h ad  a  n am e  an d  each  nam e 
gav e  b ir th  to  a  n ew  though t. A s w e re tu rn ed  to  th e  h o u se  every  o b jec t 
w h ich  I to u c h e d  seem ed  to  q u iv er w ith  life . T h a t w as b e cau se  I saw  ev e ry ­
th in g  w ith  th e  strange n ew  sig h t th a t h ad  co m e to  m e.
It seems presumptuous to attempt to interpret Helen’s experience, as it would be 
foolish for a blind man to describe the colour o f a sunset. But it appears that 
Helen realized for the first time that w-a-t-e-r was not a sequence of taps 
indicating her need but a substance which stood apart from her need, though it 
could also supply it. It stood apart from her need, objectively -  it was the sub­
stance in its own objective existence. W-a-t-e-r was not her supply but water, 
whether from the pump or in a cup, or in the rain, or in a stream.
Naturalists often remark that one o f the chief delights o f a walk in the country is 
that they can identify the plants and animals o f which they know the name. When 
we know the name, in some peculiar way we understand the nature of a thing. It 
is this kind o f conviction which prompted Moses to ask God His name. To most 
primitive people a name is very secret, for when one has obtained the name o f a 
person one has obtained a peculiar power over him. Indeed if a child in its first 
few months, turns out to be constantly unwell, the Chukchee o f Siberia believe it 
has been given the wrong name, and they will change it. The Eskimo do not be­
lieve the child has a soul until it has a name, and thus no murder is involved in 
infanticide so long as the child is still unnamed.
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Cassirer (1948:35) gives us the record o f Laura Bridgeman’s experience:
Long before Laura Bridgeman had learned to speak, she had developed a 
very curious mode of expression, a language of her own. This language did 
not consist of articulated sounds but only of various noises which are de­
scribed as ‘emotional noises’. She was in the habit of uttering those sounds 
in the presence of certain persons. Thus they became entirely individua­
lized. Every person in her environment was greeted by a special noise. 
‘Whenever she met an acquaintance unexpectedly,’ writes Dr. Lieber, ‘I 
found that she repeatedly uttered the word for that person before she began 
to speak. It was the utterance of pleasurable recognition.’ But when by 
means of the finger alphabet the child had grasped the meaning of human 
language the case was altered. Now the sound really became a name; and 
this name was not bound to an individual person but could be changed if the 
circumstances led to require it. One day, for instance, Laura Bridgeman had 
a letter from her former teacher, Miss Drew, who in the meantime by her 
marriage had become Mrs. Morton. In this letter she was invited to visit her 
teacher. This gave her great pleasure, but she found fault with Miss Drew 
because she had signed the letter with her old name instead of using the 
name of her husband. She even said that now she must find another noise 
for her teacher as the one for Miss Drew must not be the same as that for 
Mrs. Morton. It is clear that the former ‘noises’ have here undergone an 
important and very interesting change in meaning. They are no longer spe­
cial utterances, inseparable from a particular concrete situation. They have 
become abstract names. For the new name invented by the child did not 
designate a new individual, but the same individual in a new relationship.
Laura Bridgeman subsequently studied arithmetic and geography, and actually 
became a successful teacher o f others who were both blind and deaf, and like 
Helen Keller she manifestly lived an amazingly full, interesting, and genuinely 
enjoyable life.
From both these instances there is much to learn. In the first place there seems to 
be some form of inborn capacity to make emotional noises, and this is shared by 
animals. That this is not dependent upon mimic is evident from the fact that ani­
mals brought up in entire isolation make all the ordinary cries and calls o f their 
species, although trained animals and domesticated animals develop certain addi­
tional sounds or variant cries. It is generally held for example, that dogs only 
bark when domesticated, howling only when entirely wild.
The second thing that we may note is that both girls developed an entirely dif­
ferent, and it may be said specifically human, personality once they had acquired 
genuine speech. Moreover, in the initial stages o f this acquisition, it was a hunger 
for the names o f things which most rapidly built up the power o f speech, and not 
the desire to understand the things they could name.
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9. So who did speak first?
The question still remains, as we consider this extraordinary and long overlooked 
or minimized trait o f human nature: Where and how did it all begin? We have 
the case of two Indian children, Amala and Kamala, neither o f whom had spoken 
one word between them, although they shared each other’s company. Reverting 
back to the very first pair, whom we may most reasonably refer to as Adam and 
Eve for purposes of identification, who or what first induced them to talk to one 
another?
Names stand for processes, and knowing the name seems to deceive us into 
thinking we understand the process. Those committed to the evolutionary origin 
o f man must fall back upon the use of a magic word for the appearance of the 
special kind o f brain man has which make speech possible for him. They tell us it 
was a ‘mutation’ o f some sort! And there we have the whole ‘explanation’.
But even if a name were an explanation, they still have not told us who spoke first 
to start the process off, nor are we told what kind o f a conversation would be 
most probable -  though we might have guessed by now that the one who began 
the process must be one who was other than Adam and Eve, and prior to them 
and must already have been a speaking person. And we might have guessed, too, 
that the first words would have to be a list o f the names o f things.
In the first chapter o f the book of Genesis we are constantly told that G o d  sa id  ... 
and not merely what God did. Moreover, in the creation o f man a peculiar 
change takes place in the narrative, for having noted the recurrent phrase "Let the 
sea bring forth" or "Let the earth bring forth" as though directions were given to 
that which is inanimate to obey the word thus spoken, when the creation o f man 
is in view, we are immediately presented with a conversation in heaven. That 
God was not speaking to the heavenly host o f angels when He said, "Let us make 
man ..." is clear from the fact that man was to be made in H is image, and after 
His likeness. This conversation therefore originated and was carried on within 
the Godhead. He who first spoke to Adam was God, who had already been con­
versing  about him.
What follows in the story is o f real importance. Any thoughtful reader must 
surely be struck by the frequency with which the idea o f ‘naming’ things occurs 
in this early record. In some books one finds the glossary of terms at the end, 
although they are needed at the beginning. In this instance, however, and for rea­
sons which are obvious in the light o f what we know o f the faculty o f human 
speech, the meaning o f the first words and the names o f the ordinary phenomena 
about which God wished to inform Adam were given to him in some detail. Thus 
a name is given to the heavens, and to the earth, making more specific the general
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reference to them in Genesis 1:1. It is as though God had said ‘Now I wish to tell 
you about these phenomena; and henceforth therefore we will refer to the sky as 
heaven, and to the soil on which you stand as earth, to the light as day and the 
darkness as night, to the waters as sea, the atmosphere as the firmament, and we 
will name the rivers, and the sun and the moon, and even the stars’. Then two 
trees are singled out and given compound names, the tree o f life and the tree of 
the knowledge o f good and evil.
Then Adam received his own name. But there is a break in the narrative at this 
point. Having established a frame of reference, Adam was now invited to speak 
for himself. M ost o f us like to name our own pets. Part o f the commission given 
to Adam was that he should govern the animals, and it was natural therefore that 
he should be invited to name them for himself. None of them had any name up 
till then, and thus with artless simplicity the record says that whatever Adam 
called any creature, that was thenceforth its name.
Now we are not told how he named them. We do not know whether he was 
guided by their colour, size, shape, or the cries they made. But what followed 
this naming ceremony seems to imply that there was a more significant reason for 
giving him the task. There are some who believe that Adam was merely one of 
many such representatives of manlike creatures, perhaps a special Hom o Sapiens 
singled out by the Creator who had then given him the benefit o f a unique spirit. 
But the record seems in a remarkable manner to go out o f its way to make it clear 
that Adam was the only man alive at that time. In Genesis 2:5 we are told that 
"there was not a man to till the ground". In Genesis 2:18 we are told that God 
had remarked, "It was not good that man should be alone". In Genesis 2:20 we 
are told that "there was not found a companion for him". And finally in Genesis 
3:90 it is stated that Eve became the mother o f all living. It seems clear from the 
wording o f Genesis 2:18-23 that God wanted Adam to discover for himself that 
he could never find among the lower forms o f life a suitable companion in his 
loneliness. It seems obvious that if  Adam had been a slouching half-ape creature, 
God might well have brought to him other creatures o f the primate stock that dif­
fered little from himself which might have sufficed for his half-intelligent mind as 
an appropriate mate. However, with proper insight, Adam gave to each animal 
brought to him a name by which he signified in some way his reaction and his 
evaluation o f its relative position with respect to himself.
That this is so, is clear when one reads what followed the naming process. Re­
moved into a state o f unconsciousness (perhaps tired by the exercise o f  judge­
ment in such a critical matter), God performed an operation isolating part o f 
Adam and constituting that part into a new whole. Awakening from sleep, and 
quite probably still supposing that the process o f naming must continue, he is pre­
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sented with this creature in whom he instantly recognizes a true helpmeet, and a 
very part o f himself.
The whole story is so simply written and so profound in its insight into the nature 
o f speech and the forms which it first takes in childhood, and the true significance 
o f the use of names for things, that it is almost as though God had deliberately 
cast the record in such a form that it might shed its own light on one o f the pro- 
foundest o f all mysteries. At any rate it is the only light we have. There is no 
other from any other source.
10. Conclusion
Roger Brown (1968:192) sums the situation up very effectively when he wrote:
N e ith e r  fera l n o r  iso la ted  m an  c rea tes  h is  o w n  lan g u ag e  th ese  days, b u t 
m u st n o t such  a m an  hav e  do n e  so o n ce  in  so m e p reh is to ric  tim e  an d  so  go t 
lan g u ag e  s ta rted ?  A c tu a lly  the  c ircu m stan ces in  w h ich  lan g u ag e  m u st have  
b eg u n  re p re se n t a  co m b in a tio n  fo r  w h ich  w e  can  p ro v id e  n o  in stances.
W e hav e  an im a ls  am o n g  an im als, an im als in lin g u istic  co m m u n itie s , and 
h u m an s am o n g  an im als; b u t in no n e  o f  th ese  cases d o es  lan g u ag e  develop .
W e h av e  h u m an s ra ise d  in lin g u istic  co m m u n itie s  an d  in  th e se  c ircu m ­
sta n ces  lan g u ag e  do es develop . W h a t ab o u t a  h u m an  b o m  in to  a h u m an  
so c ie ty  th a t h a s  n o  language?  W e d o n ’t k n o w  o f  an y  su ch  so c ie tie s , an d  so 
w e  d o n ’t k n o w  o f  an y  su ch  in d iv iduals. B u t th ese  m u st hav e  b e e n  the  
c ircu m stan ces  o f  lan g u ag e  o rig ina tion .
Susanne Langer (1952:87-88) made a significant admission therefore when she 
concluded, "The problem is so baffling that it is no longer considered respect­
able".
Revelation is all that remains to us, and that revelation has been set forth in clear 
simple terms. God spoke to Adam first. And in due time Adam learned to speak 
with God. This unique gift o f speech makes possible the unique relationship 
which man has with God, a capacity for conscious fellowship and communica­
tion, with all that this implies.
For this fellowship man was created, and without it he is like a feral child, an or­
phan, and terribly alone. To communicate with others is necessary for the gene­
ration o f a soul in the personal sense o f the term. To communicate with God is 
necessary for that soul to be truly alive. And this kind of communication involves 
a fellowship based upon a true reconciliation between God and man.
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